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Abstract: Hadley v Baxendale remoteness is generally regarded favourably in the law and 
economics literature. Orthodox theory views remoteness as an efficient rule, although its 
purported efficiency virtues vary. Most economic models portray remoteness as an information 
disclosure device which bridges information asymmetry and regulates rates of contracting, 
precautions against breach and even reliance by promisees. Yet the assumptions of economic 
models are denied by the content that courts attribute to the doctrine. This paper suggests that 
remoteness is an inefficient rule which entails certain costs, particularly through its impact on 
performance/breach decisions, but only uncertain and modest efficiency gains. It is argued that 
a more efficient default rule would allow full recovery of expectation damages. The paradigm-
changing judgment in The Achilleas could pave the way for such superior rule rather than add 
an imprecise test of remoteness to the existing Hadley rule. The paper contrasts the English 
and US solutions with functional equivalents of remoteness from Germany, France and 
Quebec, which come closer than the common law to the economic models’ version of 
remoteness or the expectation damages rule. The analysis shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the 
efficiency of the common law of contract is too often taken for granted. 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Despite historic entrenchment, the remoteness rule and its functional equivalents in US, 
German, French, and Quebec law – liability-limiting devices that employ foreseeability criteria 
to determine compensable damage – remain obscure figures. The unstable foundations of 
remoteness – and its conceptually similar US counterpart, unforeseeability of damage1 – were 
abruptly revealed when, in The Achilleas,2 the House of Lords departed from the over 150-year 
old precedent of Hadley v Baxendale.3 It sought to base remoteness on an agreement-centred 
test4 to avoid what was believed to be, on the facts, an abnormal result deviating from the 
general market understanding. On a similar note, functional equivalents of remoteness found 
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1 Allan E Farnsworth, Contracts (4th edn, Aspen Publishers 2004) 792-99.  
2 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48, [2009] 1 AC 61 (HL).  
3 (1854) 9 Exch 341.  
4 Paul CK Wee, ‘Contractual Interpretation and Remoteness’ (2010) LMCLQ 150, 156ff. 
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in the German, French, and Quebec legal systems5 are rarely used by the courts6 or conflated 
into other requirements for damages, such as causation.7 Furthermore, the French and Quebec 
civil codes make the requirement of foreseeability inapplicable in cases of intentional or grossly 
negligent breach, and additional exceptions have been carved up in case law and 
jurisprudence.8 
Judicial unease with remoteness and its functional equivalents is in line with these 
doctrines’ ambiguous economic implications. Taking the remoteness of common law as a 
prototype, this paper will first critically assess such doctrines’ rationale, as well as the 
arguments against the traditional rule of remoteness and foreseeability-based equivalents, 
concluding that these liability-limiting devices are inferior to a rule of full expectation 
damages. This economic framework will then be employed to critically assess the positive law 
of remoteness in England and Wales, as well as functional equivalents in the US, Germany, 
France, and Quebec. The economic and comparative analysis leads (perhaps surprisingly) to 
the conclusion that as concerns the examined subject, the civil law systems of Germany, 
France, and Quebec provide the more efficient solutions. 
 
B. IS THE DEFAULT RULE OF REMOTENESS DESIRABLE? 
Traditional Hadley remoteness famously prescribes compensation for such damage as may 
fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally – in the usual course of events – from 
the breach or which may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the 
parties when the contract was made. Underlying the judicial acceptance of remoteness is a 
moral judgment expressed, for example, in The Heron II:9 it would be too ‘harsh’ to hold a 
promisor liable for the unforeseeable consequences of his breach of contract. This judgment 
encapsulates a form of distributive justice. However, quite apart from expressions of scepticism 
towards the assumptions and means of distributive justice,10 it is not clear that morality or 
distributive justice requires that, following a breach of contract, some of the damage – the 
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unforeseeable part – should be left to lie with the innocent promisee rather than be shifted onto 
the promisor who caused the damage. Considering the frail moral and distributive basis for 
remoteness, it is not surprising that most analyses of remoteness turn on matters of allocative 
efficiency. The efficiency arguments in favour of or against remoteness will be critically 
examined in this part of the paper. The balance of these considerations suggests that the default 
rule of remoteness is inferior to a rule allowing full recovery of expectation damages. 
1. The Economic Rationale of Remoteness 
Hadley remoteness – with the insights of this analysis being equally applicable to functional 
equivalents in the US, Germany, France, and Quebec – is claimed to address three types of 
inefficiencies: the preclusion of efficient contracts with promisees who place a below-average 
value on performance;11 the taking of inefficient precaution against breach by promisors who 
are unaware of the risk of unusual loss; 12  and inefficient reliance on performance by 
promisees.13 These inefficiencies are considered to flow from either of two forms of market 
failure, ie information asymmetry or externalisation by the promisee of costs of inefficient 
reliance. 
a) Information Asymmetry and Rates of Contracting and Precaution 
In real-world settings, contractual parties have imperfect information. In general, only the 
promisee, and not the promisor, has cost-justified access to information concerning that 
promisee’s specific circumstances, which might lead to higher-than-average loss incurred in 
case of breach. This information asymmetry can give rise to the ‘market for lemons’ famously 
explained by Akerlof.14 Unsure of the subjective valuation of performance by any individual 
promisee and therefore of his own expected cost of breach, the rational promisor will use 
statistical inferences from market data to determine an average expected cost of breach. On this 
basis, he will charge an average price for his performance and will take an average level of 
precaution against breach. This may drive out of the market promisees that value performance 
at less than such average price,15 and the process can replicate until the market is shrunk out of 
existence.16 Regarding the fewer contracts that are concluded, high-value promisees have no 
                                                 
11 Eric A Posner, ‘Contract Remedies: Foreseeability, Precaution, Causation and Mitigation’, Encycopaedia of 
Law and Economics (2000), <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4620book.pdf> accessed 17 January 2016. 
12 John H Barton, ‘The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract’ (1972) 1 J Leg Stud 277, 295-96; E 
Posner (n 11). 
13 Robert B Cooter Jr and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (6th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2014) 327-29.  
14 George A Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 Q J 
Econ 488.  
15 E Posner (n 11) 165-66.  
16 Akerlof (n 14) 490.  
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incentive to communicate their subjective expectation regardless of what low-value promisees 
do. The former will simply prefer the combination of a lower price, subsidised by low-value 
promisees, and expectation damages which make them indifferent towards the level of 
precaution against breach that promisors adopt.17 The average level of precaution that would 
become generalised in a no-communication equilibrium would be socially suboptimal.18 In the 
case of contracts with high-value promisees, there would be room for incremental precaution, 
the cost of which would be offset by the greater losses thus averted. Remoteness is thought to 
address this inefficiency by acting, in Ayres and Gertner’s terminology, as a ‘penalty default’ 
rule meant not to mirror a complete contract,19 but to induce high-value promisees to disclose 
their potential consequential damages.20 The result, the argument goes, is that promisors will 
thus distinguish between the different types of promisees, with all those not revealing their 
higher-than-average expectation being treated as low-value promisees. A communication21 and 
separation 22  equilibrium will emerge wherein different price, precaution and damages 
packages will be offered to the different categories of promisees, ensuring efficient rates of 
contracting and differentiated precaution.23 
b) Reliance costs 
In an original approach to remoteness, Cooter and Ulen view this liability-limiting doctrine as 
a possible partial solution to the ‘paradox of compensation’.24 In the economics of law, this 
paradox stems from the fact that no particular measure of damages can successfully provide 
incentives for both efficient performance/breach decisions by the promisor and efficient 
reliance decisions by the promisee. In particular, expectation damages – the general measure 
of damages in contract25 – cause the promisee to treat performance as certain. Because they are 
meant to act as a substitute for all the benefits of specific performance, perfect expectation 
damages provide the promisee with the guarantee that the full subjective value of performance 
is forthcoming whether the promise is actually performed or not. Therefore, the promisee will 
                                                 
17 Lucian A Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, ‘Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The 
Rule of Hadley v Baxendale’ (1991) 7 J L Econ & Org 284, 286.  
18 ibid 291. 
19 The notion is discussed, for example, in Steven Shavell, ‘Damage Measures for Breach of Contract’ (1980) 11 
Bell J Econ 466, 466-67. 
20 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ 
(1989) 99 Yale LJ 87, 101-102, 111-12, 118; see also Lisa Bernstein, ‘Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis’ 
(1993) 3 S Cal Interdisc LJ 59, 64ff.  
21 Bebchuk and Shavell (n 17) 290. 
22 Ayres and Gertner (n 20) 111-12. 
23 E Posner (n 11).  
24 Cooter and Ulen (n 13) 325, 327-29.  
25 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850, 855; Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (10th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 
2013) 334. 
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invest in reliance up to the point where the marginal cost of reliance equals the marginal 
increase in the expected benefit of performance, which he is sure to receive. Yet reliance 
expenditure is socially wasteful unless actual performance, the value of which it is supposed to 
augment, is carried out. In conclusion, efficiency requires that, in the promisee’s calculation of 
the limits of reliance investments, marginal increases in the expected benefit of performance 
should be discounted by the probability of performance.26 By limiting recovery to a level below 
the expectation measure, remoteness causes the promisee to internalise the cost of incremental 
reliance once damages, having reached the remoteness barrier, become invariable. 
Consequently, remoteness serves to correct the negative externality which the expectation 
measure enables the promisee’s reliance decisions to produce. 
2. The Bigger Picture: Why Remoteness Is Inefficient 
Principled attacks on remoteness are rare in the law and economics movement. Eric Posner, for 
example, while accepting that Hadley remoteness can successfully perform its information-
revealing function, argues that this function could be fulfilled equally efficiently by a rule of 
unlimited liability for expectation damages. The latter might, however, prove preferable in light 
of its greater clarity and ease of administration.27 More vigorously, Johnston contends that 
traditional remoteness fails to overcome the strategic incentives that the parties to a transaction 
have in withholding valuable private information. Such problem is exacerbated if the promisor 
has market power.28 Eisenberg explores the shortcomings of remoteness in an unambiguous 
challenge of the doctrine.29 He convincingly argues that, in light of the information which it 
incentivises the promisee to disclose, remoteness misses its economic point. It is, in any case, 
of little practical use in the contemporary economy, the scale of which renders stratified pricing 
and precaution too costly. Finally, it distorts incentives for the performance of promises and 
for investment in private information.30 
In the bigger picture, when the actual content of remoteness is accounted for – 
something that economic models generally fail to do – the doctrine’s efficiency justifications 
are negated. Crucially, it only requires the communication of the promisee’s special 
circumstances which may lead to consequential loss, and not of the extent of loss. The 
shortcomings of remoteness would only be partly mitigated if the doctrine were understood as 
                                                 
26 Alan Devlin, Fundamental Principles of Law and Economics (Routledge 2015) 201.  
27 E Posner (n 11) 166-69.  
28 Jason Scott Johnston, ‘Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules’ (1990) 100 
Yale L J 615, 630-34. 
29 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Principle of Hadley v Baxendale’ (1992) 80 Cal L Rev 563.  
30 ibid 602-603.  
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requiring disclosure of the promisee’s expected loss. Even if the efficiency justifications of 
remoteness were conceded in principle, they are outweighed by the inefficiency that the 
doctrine generates with respect to performance/breach decisions, as well as communication, 
stratification and litigation costs. 
a) Remoteness and Rates of Contracting, Precaution and Reliance 
Economic models favourable to remoteness assume that the object of the communication which 
renders a certain loss recoverable is the extent of such loss consequent upon breach.31 That, 
however, is not what the rule requires to make loss recoverable. The requirement, as set out by 
Scarman LJ in Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd,32 is that the type of loss be 
reasonably contemplated, even if the specific consequences for which the promisee claims 
compensation are not foreseeable. In Parsons, therefore, it did not matter that the parties could 
not contemplate that the defective storage hopper would lead to Parsons incurring the loss of 
the 254 pigs killed by the outbreak of E. coli, so long as injury to or death of the animals was 
a reasonably contemplated result of Uttley Ingham’s breach of their obligation to supply a 
hopper fit for purpose. The same result was reached in Brown v KMR Services Ltd.33 The rule 
applies to types of damage foreseeable under either of the limbs of Hadley, which are deemed 
to embody a single rule prescribing recoverability of reasonably contemplated loss.34 
It follows that how remoteness actually operates is disconnected from how economic 
models generally portray its mechanism. Based on the imputed knowledge of ordinary 
circumstances, the promisor is liable for ordinary loss, regardless of its extent; if the promisee 
reveals his special circumstances, the promisor becomes liable for such type of consequential 
loss as can be reasonably contemplated, again regardless of its extent. The net result is that, 
irrespective of whether or not the promisee reveals his special circumstances which indicate 
that consequential loss may occur, the promisor will not have a representation of the extent of 
his liability.35 Yet it is exactly this cost of breach that the promisor needs to determine in order 
to take the optimal level of precaution. 
The lack of any necessary correlation between ordinary and below-average damages or 
between consequential and above-average damages was arguably the underlying problem 
                                                 
31 Barton (n 12) 295-96; Jeffrey M Perloff, ‘Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v 
Baxendale’ (1981) 10 J Leg Stud 39, 40-42; Ayres and Gertner (n 20) 101-102; Bebchuk and Shavell (n 17) 285-
87. 
32 [1978] QB 791 (CA) 813. 
33 [1995] 4 All ER 598 (CA). 
34 Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2005] UKHL 3, [2005] 1 WLR 377 (HL) [46]-[49] (Lord Walker).  
35 Eisenberg (n 29) 600, 603.  
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which led the Victoria Laundry court to an awkward solution. It treated lost profits 
corresponding to the highly lucrative potential contracts with the Ministry of Supply as a kind 
of consequential loss, different from usual profits. To recover the former, the claimant would 
have had to inform the defendant ‘of the prospect and terms of such contracts’.36 It is odd to 
suggest that, in commercial relations, the defendant could not contemplate that the claimant 
would pounce on a lucrative opportunity arising in his usual course of business. The court drew 
a line in the sand to separate ordinary and consequential losses on the criterion of extent. This 
approach was not followed subsequently in cases such as Parsons and Brown. Both involved 
direct or ordinary damages which were held to be recoverable despite being unusually 
extensive. 
Against this backdrop, the distinction between high-valuation and low-valuation 
promisees cannot serve to justify remoteness on efficiency grounds. By creating incentives for 
the promisee to reveal only circumstances that make it possible to reasonably contemplate a 
certain type of loss, remoteness does not cure the information asymmetry concerning the 
promisee’s expected loss. Hence, it does not enable promisors to offer differentiated price, 
precaution, and liability packages and is inadequate for the economic function of inducing 
efficient rates of contracting and precaution.  
The same problem, arising from the actual content of the doctrine of remoteness, makes 
it easy to dismiss the efficiency justification concerning the promisee’s level of reliance. This 
justification requires that foreseeable reliance equate efficient reliance.37 However, the obvious 
objection to this proposition is that, within the terminology of remoteness, foreseeable reliance 
must mean foreseeable types of reliance expenditure, and not some definite amount. There is 
no reason to suppose that reliance subsumed to a certain type is precisely what efficient reliance 
of that type would be. 
To conclude, the actual content of Hadley remoteness, very much an issue even after 
The Achilleas, as the case of Supershield demonstrates,38 is inaccurately reflected in economic 
models which present remoteness as an efficient rule. Such models are predicated on an 
alternative understanding of remoteness, one requiring promisees to disclose the extent of the 
damage that they are exposed to. This, however, is not the court-adopted understanding. 
Despite the isolated side-stepping of the problem in Victoria Laundry, the existing law is that 
                                                 
36 Victoria Landry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 (CA), 543 (Asquith LJ). 
37 Cooter and Ulen (n 13) 328. 
38 Supershield Ltd v Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 7, [2010] 1 CLC 241 (CA) [43] 
(Toulson LJ). 
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only the type of damage – not its extent – must be foreseeable, meaning that remoteness cannot 
systematically promote efficiency as regards rates of contracting, precaution and reliance. 
b) Adopting the Alternative Understanding 
It might appear from the analysis made above that remoteness could be redeemed economically 
if, perhaps by reviving the reasoning that underpinned the Victoria Laundry judgment, it were 
understood as requiring the promisee to reveal the extent of his expected loss. There are, 
however, multiple reasons why the benefits of this version of remoteness are likely to be trivial 
compared to the efficiency loss that the doctrine engenders. The only redeeming quality of this 
alternative rule is that, by limiting recovery to the extent of the loss communicated by the 
promisee, it enables the promisor to identify promisees who make no communication as those 
who expect below-average damages in case of breach. These promisees can therefore be drawn 
into ex ante efficient contracts by a low price and low precaution package. As concerns 
reliance, there is, in this version of remoteness also, no reason to believe that the foreseeable 
damage is limited to the efficient reliance investment. For instance, there will generally be 
some net expectation (profit) that, regardless of reliance, will be foreseeable, as the ‘normal’ 
profit reasoning of Victoria Laundry demonstrates. This efficiency justification of remoteness 
thus remains unproved. Most importantly, even this version of remoteness cannot, with any 
certainty, address the problem of efficient precaution taken by the promisor. 
One reason for this resides in possible post-contractual fluctuations in the promisee’s 
gross expectation interest39 due to unforeseeable contingencies. These can mean that, when the 
contract is concluded, there is no genuine information asymmetry concerning the promisee’s 
gross expectation interest at the future time of performance/breach decisions, which is the 
actual information needed for efficient precaution (The Achilleas exemplifies this problem). 
Put differently, when the contract is concluded, the promisee may be no more aware than the 
promisor of future circumstances that will render performance more or less valuable, such as 
an unexpected increase in the market price at which the promisee could resell purchased goods. 
Another reason why this purported efficiency gain from remoteness is uncertain is that, 
when the parties’ strategic incentives to exploit their private information are considered, the 
information-revealing mechanism of remoteness cannot function as intended. Richard Posner 
alludes to this problem when noting that should remoteness require disclosure of foreseeable 
lost profits, it would then deprive the promisee of the benefits of being a good bargainer.40 
                                                 
39 LL Fuller and William R Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ (1936) 46 Yale L J 52, 73-74. 
40 R Posner (n 10) 139-40.  
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Johnston demonstrates that the parties’ strategic incentives to exploit the value of private 
information are at odds with the information-revealing rationale of remoteness. 41  Most 
importantly, the promisee has the natural incentive – contrary to that provided by remoteness 
– not to reveal his own private information concerning expected losses. Such revelations would 
signal his willingness to pay and enable the promisor to bargain for a larger share of the joint 
surplus created by the contract. This problem will be exacerbated if the promisor has market 
power.42 Such conflicting incentives make it difficult to believe that remoteness runs smoothly 
to provide the promisor with a representation of his expected cost of breach. More probably, 
the promisee will reason at the margin and send what Johnston calls ‘fuzzy messages’.43 He 
will disclose such losses (assuming, implausibly, they are accurately known when the contract 
is concluded) only up to the point where the marginal benefit of the additional expected loss 
that can be recovered in case of breach equals the marginal cost to the promisee, consisting of 
a higher price. This is a further reason to believe that remoteness fails in ensuring 
communication of the information necessary for efficient precaution.  
c) The Costs of Remoteness 
At best, remoteness carries the benefit of increasing the rate of ex ante efficient contracts by 
enabling promisors to distinguish between promisees exposed to above-average or below-
average damage. Even this efficiency gain is merely theoretical, being the product of a version 
of remoteness which, although depicted in economic models, does not accurately reflect the 
legal doctrine applied by the courts. In contrast, the efficiency losses flowing from remoteness 
are substantial: this rule precludes efficient breach/performance decisions, entails high 
communication and stratification costs, and leads to costly litigation.  
First, remoteness is at odds with the theory of efficient breach. Postulated by Robert 
Birmingham in 1970,44 the theory of efficient breach explains the expectation measure of 
damages as the only one capable of inducing efficient performance/breach decisions, by 
causing the promisor to internalise the entire cost of breach and only choose to breach if, in an 
alternative use, the value of his performance is greater than such cost.45 Although strongly 
criticised by more traditional contract theorists,46 the theory remains a cornerstone of contract 
                                                 
41 Johnston (n 28).  
42 ibid 633-34.  
43 ibid 630.  
44 Robert Birmingham, ‘Breach of Contract, Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency’ (1970) 24 Rutgers L 
Rev 273.  
45 R Posner (n 10) 131.  
46 Daniel Friedmann, ‘The Efficient Breach Fallacy’ (1989) 18 J Legal Stud 1. 
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law and economics. Recent explanations show that, once understood in all its implications, 
particularly from the perspective of the price effects of different remedial measures, the 
efficient breach theory is in line with the conceptions of autonomy of will and does not 
necessarily depend on justification from a social welfare perspective.47 The desirability of 
efficient breach reflects badly on remoteness, which, by limiting recovery below the 
expectation measure, allows the promisor to externalise the unforeseeable costs of breach. 
Remoteness thus lowers the private cost of breach to the promisor and induces inefficiently 
high levels of contractual non-performance.  
Second, the operation of remoteness as an information-revealing device necessarily 
implies the cost of promisees collecting, sorting, and transmitting the information relevant to 
their expected losses.48 Transaction costs are increased by the parties’ conflicting strategic 
incentives,49 as promisors attempt to capture more of the consumer surplus that remoteness 
incentivises promisees to reveal. Remoteness thus becomes a ‘sticky’ default rule, expensive 
to contract around. 50 
Third, the correlative of the promisee’s communication costs are the costs incurred by 
promisors for using the information provided by stratifying precaution.51 These would be 
particularly high in modern economies of scale and scope, which make it unrealistic to expect 
high-volume producers of homogenous goods to collect information from individual 
purchasers and adjust individual products accordingly. Promisors would prefer the alternative 
of more cost-efficient, uniform precautionary measures, coupled with insurance, including self-
insurance, with premiums built into the price.52 Spread across high volumes of output, the price 
effects of such insurance would be sufficiently low to render negligible any loss of efficiency 
in the form of foregone contracts.  
Finally, remoteness is a source of considerable litigation costs, invariably raising the 
difficult issue of the foreseeability test and its relation to the corresponding test in tort.53 At 
least three levels of foreseeability can be distinguished in the abstract,54 and cases such as 
                                                 
47  Gregory Klass, ‘Efficient Breach’, in Gregory Klass, George Letsas, Prince Saprai (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2015) 362.  
48 Eisenberg (n 29) 594.  
49 Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of the Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1, 15-19. 
50 Omri Ben-Shahar and John AE Pottow, ‘On the Stickiness of Default Rules’ (2005) 33 Fla St U L Rev 651-52, 
662.  
51 Eisenberg (n 29) 593.  
52 ibid 593-95.  
53 Cartwright (n 9) 492-96.  
54 Eisenberg (n 29) 566-67.  
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Victoria Laundry, Monarch Steamship,55 and The Heron II illustrate the judicial uncertainty in 
framing any specific test. This adds to the equally difficult question of what must be established 
– the specific information communicated, the possible additional test of assumption of risk – 
to determine whether the remoteness limit on recovery has been displaced. 
Against this background, the conclusion of economic analysis appears straightforward. 
At best, remoteness presents uncertain efficiency gains, for which better tools are available in 
modern economies. The costs of remoteness are, in contrast, both certain and sufficiently great 
to offset the possible gains. Economic analysis therefore suggests that the doctrine is inefficient 
and undesirable from a normative legal standpoint. 
3. A Better Rule 
Of itself, the negative efficiency outcome of remoteness might appear sufficient to advocate in 
favour of the rule being discarded. However, a further question is whether alternative rules fare 
any better in terms of efficiency. Eisenberg supports a regime of ‘proximate cause, contractual 
allocation of loss and fair disclosure’,56 which is still short of what is sometimes termed 
‘unlimited liability’,57 ie a rule of full expectation damages. It is suggested that this latter rule 
is the most efficient and should therefore provide the benchmark for the positive and normative 
assessment of the law of remoteness and its functional equivalents. 
As concerns the issue of reliance on the promise, any rule expanding liability admittedly 
is in danger of inducing inefficiently high levels of reliance. Yet, because there is no way of 
determining if and by how much the limit set to recovery by remoteness is below or above the 
level of efficient reliance, it is also not possible to determine whether a more expansive default 
rule would be more or less efficient than remoteness. On the matter of reliance, the comparison 
can only be indeterminate. In terms of bridging information asymmetry, however, Eisenberg’s 
proximate cause regime and the rule of full expectation damages are effective in incentivising 
the revelation of information and therefore in addressing the market failure which upsets rates 
of contract formation and precaution. 58  However, Eisenberg’s proposition, centred on a 
reasonable foreseeability test imported from the law of tort, appears to simply substitute one 
costly legal mechanism for another and preserves the problem of preclusion of efficient breach. 
The system advocated by Eisenberg is founded on the idea that recoverable damage in 
contract should comprise only consequences that have the breach of contract as their proximate 
                                                 
55 Monarch Steamship Co v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196 (HL).  
56 Eisenberg (n 29) 598. 
57 Bebchuk and Shavell (n 17) 285.  
58 Eisenberg (n 29) 598-604; E Posner (n 11) 168; Cooter and Ulen (n 13) 329.  
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cause. Proximate causation is determined using the reasonable foreseeability test applicable in 
tort and the moment of breach rather than the conclusion of the contract as the reference point 
for applying the test. Generating a wider scope for liability compared to the reasonable 
contemplation test, Eisenberg’s proposed rule of recovery would be accompanied by clauses 
allocating losses. But because such liability-limiting clauses depress the promisee’s expected 
benefit from the contract, they should be enforceable only if subject to sufficient notice to the 
promisee.59 Although superficially attractive, this system fails to resolve pressing efficiency 
problems raised by remoteness and is therefore inferior to the full expectation damages rule. 
Apart from the arguable confusion between remoteness and causation, which English 
law appears to have overcome after Quinn v Burch Bros (Builders)60 and Galoo v Bright 
Grahame Murray, 61  Eisenberg’s alternative regime has one important deficiency when 
examined against the theory of efficient breach. Specifically, by employing a test of reasonable 
foreseeability, it precludes the proper application of the theory, which Eisenberg himself 
supports. Eisenberg’s rule remains undercompensatory compared to the expectation measure, 
the use of which is a premise of efficient breach. Although less than that entailed by the more 
stringent reasonable contemplation test of traditional remoteness, the efficiency loss still exists. 
It concerns cases of highly sophisticated promisors who, at the time of breach, can and perhaps 
actually do foresee losses beyond the threshold of the reasonable foreseeability test. They could 
ignore such losses because the test is objective and, apart from the commercial capacity of the 
promisor, does not make allowance for individual characteristics.62 By comparison, a rule of 
full expectation damages would not provide a foreseeability threshold for recovery. It would 
thus ensure that promisors, including highly sophisticated ones, take into account all losses 
actually foreseen, an incentive which supports the efficient breach theory. 
As concerns litigation costs, Eisenberg’s system appears to be as inefficient as 
remoteness. It merely replaces one, more rigid, foreseeability test with a laxer one: the risk of 
the damage occurring should be ‘more than marginal’ or ‘not insignificant’.63 There is little 
reason to believe that it would be easier for the courts to determine a ‘not insignificant’ prospect 
of damage than, for example, the ‘not unlikely’ prospect referred to by Lord Reid in The Heron 
II. These costs are not incurred in the application of a full expectation damages rule, which 
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would only raise the issue of causation, a common denominator (and therefore a basic cost) for 
regimes of damages in contract.  
In this context, of the available regimes, the preferable one is that which allows recovery 
for full expectation damages. It has already been shown that the expectation damages rule is 
best suited to incentivise efficient breach/performance decisions. Certainly, this system cannot 
cure the problem of inefficient reliance on the promise, but this shortcoming is also common 
to the remoteness regime and Eisenberg’s proposed rule, and is a manifestation of the known 
‘paradox of compensation’.64 In terms of bridging information asymmetry and thus inducing 
efficiency in rates of contracting and precaution, this proposed system fares better than both 
remoteness and Eisenberg’s proposed regime, reaching similar results at lower costs. Game 
theory shows that the information-revelation process sought through remoteness is also 
achieved by the expectation damages rule.65  Under this rule, promisees expecting above-
average losses have no incentive to disclose such losses only to pay a higher price for no 
additional benefit. Promisors will thus be induced to self-protect by treating every promisee 
that does not disclose expected losses as one with above-average losses and consequently 
charging a high price. Knowing this, promisees expecting below-average losses at the time of 
contract conclusion will be driven by self-interest to communicate this information and to make 
this signal reliable by agreeing to clauses limiting liability. Consequently, the expectation 
damages rule cures the information asymmetry regarding the promisee’s exposure to loss 
known at the time of contracting. Thus, it ensures that ex ante efficient contracts are not 
foregone and that the promisor is provided with the information necessary for efficient 
precaution at this initial contractual stage. Conceding this, the proponents of remoteness argue 
that stimulating the communication of information in this way is more costly than under 
remoteness.66 The reasoning is that, while incurring the same individual cost of communication 
as promisees with below-average expected loss, those with above-average loss are fewer and 
should therefore, collectively, incur lower communication costs than promisees with below-
average loss. Yet there are good reasons to doubt this. The degrees of loss that promisees can 
be exposed to are as varied as the myriad idiosyncratic preferences that people may have. 
Therefore, as Eric Posner correctly points out, the supposition that low loss promisees 
outnumber the high loss ones is unsupported and a more appropriate premise of the analysis 
should be a normal distribution of the exposure to loss and therefore equal proportions of low 
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and high loss promisees. 67  Contrary to Eric Posner’s conclusion, however, there are two 
reasons why this does not necessarily render the comparison of the rules indeterminate.  
First, the comparison clearly favours the expectation damages rule once the actual legal 
content of the doctrine of remoteness is accounted for.68 Specifically, because contracting 
around remoteness implies the communication of special circumstances leading to 
consequential loss and not of any upper limit of expected loss, the promisor still faces open-
ended damages. The communicating promisee is insured against uncapped losses and, as such, 
will not have an incentive to offer limitations of liability. Negotiations will therefore extend to 
a price increase which the promisor charges as an insurance premium, generating additional 
transaction costs. Conversely, no such subject arises when the parties contract out of the 
expectation damages rule. Transaction costs should therefore be lower. The limitation of 
liability offered by the promisee expecting below-average losses will place an upper limit on 
the promisor’s expected cost of breach, such that the parties will not also bargain over an 
insurance premium charged by the promisor. 
Second, costs of contracting around the relevant default rules are just one dimension of 
the comparison. Another is the overall efficiency gain (or loss) that the default rules entail when 
not displaced. 69  On this front also, the expectation rule demonstrates superiority. Unlike 
remoteness and Eisenberg’s intermediate regime, the expectation rule can incentivise efficient 
performance/breach decisions and avoids important litigation costs because it does away with 
the need for additional, invariably ambiguous tests of foreseeability. 
In conclusion, remoteness, even in the idealised version portrayed in economic models, 
is inefficient. Eisenberg’s system addresses some of the problems of remoteness but stops short 
of what is necessary to enable efficient breach/performance decisions and cost savings, 
especially concerning litigation. A better, more efficient system is that which takes the extra 
step and employs the expectation damages rule. 
 
C. LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The value of economic analysis generally resides in providing the tools for positive assessment 
of how legal rules work or normative recommendations for how they should be structured, 
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interpreted and applied.70 The following sections aim to apply the economic framework built 
thus far to the relevant rules in the English, US, German, French, and Quebec legal systems. 
1. English Law 
The conclusions of economic analysis apply squarely to Hadley remoteness, as developed by 
the courts. It is arguably an inefficient default rule. The question, therefore, is whether recent 
developments in English law enable changes which can accommodate normative 
recommendations resulting from economic analysis. The most important such development is 
the case of The Achilleas.71 It raised the question of damages for a nine-day delay in the 
redelivery of a chartered vessel, which, due to unusual market fluctuations, caused the follow-
on charter to be cancelled and re-contracted at a rate much lower than that prevailing at the 
contractual redelivery date. The owners claimed the difference, for the entire four-month 
duration of the follow-on charter, between the high rate initially agreed with the follow-on 
charterers and the low one eventually agreed after renegotiations following late redelivery. The 
defaulting charterers conceded only the difference between the market rate and their own 
charter rate for the nine-day delay in redelivery, a calculation which was purportedly the clear 
market understanding. Lords Hoffmann and Hope found for the charterers by applying a limit 
to recovery different from Hadley remoteness, ie an assumption of responsibility test which 
asked what loss the charterers could be taken to have assumed liability for.72 Lord Rodger and 
Baroness Hale preferred the traditional remoteness approach and produced a reasoning similar 
to that of Victoria Laundry,73 which was meant to overcome the difficulties arising from the 
Hadley remoteness doctrine leaving the promisor exposed to open-ended damages.74 Lord 
Walker is generally considered to have agreed with both lines of reasoning.75 However, despite 
the mentioning of Lord Hoffmann’s assumption of responsibility test, the ratio of Lord 
Walker’s judgment is quite clearly akin to the reasoning of Victoria Laundry. Specifically, the 
basis of the judgment was a distinction between the normal profit flowing foreseeably from a 
follow-on fixture and unforeseeable ‘loss of unusually profitable contracts’ or of ‘extraordinary 
profit’,76 effectively viewed as a different type of loss.  
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Lord Hoffmann based his reasoning in The Achilleas on jurisprudential criticism of 
Hadley remoteness by Kramer77 and Tettenborn.78 The starting point of Kramer’s theory is 
Pothier’s grounding of the foreseeability rule on a presumption concerning the parties’ 
agreement on the limits of compensation. Building on this idea, he argues that remoteness is 
not a default rule, external to the agreement, but merely a ‘rule of thumb’ for determining what 
the parties wanted. 79  Tettenborn’s similar theory is that promises should be viewed as 
‘instrumental’ or aimed at satisfying a certain purpose sought by the promisee, with liability 
thus being circumscribed to the consequences of a failure to satisfy that particular purpose.80 
As the solution devised in Victoria Laundry, such views on the limits of damages in 
contracts have been developed for purely practical reasons, in response to the perceived 
shortcomings of remoteness. Lord Hoffmann acknowledges this when stating that Victoria 
Laundry ‘helps a bit, but not all that much’ in a factual context such as that of The Achilleas, 
where there was clearly a single type of loss.81 In fact, as Kramer mentions, the judicial origins 
of such challenges of Hadley remoteness are almost as old as the Hadley case itself.82 They can 
be traced, for example, to the case of Nettleship, where Bovill CJ added to remoteness the 
caveat that the promisor’s liability for the foreseeable loss must be something ‘to which he 
assented expressly or impliedly by entering into the contract’.83 The problem, however, is that 
all the analyses which converge on the equivalent conceptions of assumption of responsibility, 
the agreement-centred approach or instrumental promises, assume that damages must be 
limited below the expectation measure, more so than Hadley remoteness allows. This is at odds 
with the teachings of economic analysis. The following paragraphs aim to show that, while the 
assumption of responsibility approach taken by Lords Hoffmann and Hope in The Achilleas is 
not tenable as a matter of legal reasoning or as an economic proposition, elements of it do open 
the way for an efficient legal solution. 
From a legal reasoning perspective, the assumption of responsibility approach has come 
under strong criticism both before and after The Achilleas for artificially finding agreement-
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based solutions in cases where the agreement must obviously ‘run out’. 84  The frailty of 
Kramer’s contention that the parties can intend or mean something that has not even crossed 
their minds becomes apparent when one considers the result of always imputing to the parties 
an agreement on the apportionment of all losses flowing from breach.85 Such losses may be 
absolutely unforeseeable when the contract is made, meaning that the assumption of 
responsibility test must effectively assume an agreement concerning elements which, at the 
conclusion of the contract, are both counterfactual and unforeseeable. Cases like Brown, as 
Wee points out,86 and Jackson, could hardly accommodate the assumption of responsibility 
approach. 
A related problem stems from Lord Hoffmann’s reliance on the SAAMCO case.87 In 
that instance, the limitation of damages to which lenders were entitled for negligent valuation 
of the land brought as security was effected by Lord Hoffmann through the concept of the scope 
of the duty of care. According to Lord Hoffmann, only the consequences of the advice being 
wrong are within the scope of such duty, and not all the consequences of the lender’s granting 
the secured loan.88 This reasoning extends the parties’ agreement not only to ‘primary rights’, 
but also to what, in The Heron II, Diplock LJ in the Court of Appeal termed ‘secondary rights’, 
ie the remedies consequent upon breach.89 Always imputing to the parties an agreement on 
secondary rights is not only unrealistic, but also unnecessary on the facts of SAAMCO. Indeed, 
once the primary duty had been interpreted in SAAMCO as a duty of care in providing correct 
advice, the further question of damages for the breach of that duty could be answered on the 
basis of causation. The breach of such limited primary duty was an immediate and dominant 
cause only for the damage resulting from the information being wrong, and not for the damage 
that would have occurred even if the informant had given correct information. The assumption 
of responsibility test perpetuates the prospect of an overlap between causation and the scope of 
the duty. 
Yet another problem of this novel approach, pointed out by Lord Walker in The 
Achilleas, is that the assumption of responsibility test is essentially a ‘watered-down’ version 
of the Nettleship proposition, which was rejected by a long line of cases.90 This, together with 
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the existence of precedents such as Jackson, also a House of Lords case, brings into question 
the theory of precedent and the issue of whether the pressing need for judicial change, required 
by the 1966 Practice Statement, has been duly made out.91 
From an economic perspective, the assumption of responsibility theory appears to 
eliminate remoteness and any substitute default rules.92 Admittedly, Lord Hoffmann views this 
as a ‘default provision’ that ‘should reflect what the parties would have assumed to be their 
respective rights and liabilities’.93 But a default rule which merely asks what the parties’ 
agreement is and thus requires tailored application on a case-by-case basis is, economically, 
equivalent to the absence of a default rule. The economic function of default rules is either to 
economise on transaction costs by providing the gap-filling rule that most parties would want 
or to provide a purposely undesirable rule in order to induce the parties to negotiate a different 
clause on that particular element of their contract.94 A default rule based on the assumption of 
responsibility test has none of the economic benefits of the former type of (majoritarian) default 
rules, since it implies case-by-case inferences concerning the parties’ agreement. It is also a 
flagrant contradiction of the economic function of the latter type of (penalty) rules, which 
provide precisely the solution that the parties do not want. Furthermore, the assumption of 
responsibility test grounds the limitation of damages in the parties’ agreement and therefore 
assumes the ex ante efficiency of such limitation. This is as unrealistic as the supposition that 
parties always agree in any meaningful sense on the counterfactual and partly unforeseeable 
consequences of breach. The new test thus runs the risk of injecting inefficient solutions into 
contracts, under the guise of ex ante efficient terms. 
Perhaps even more damaging economically than the lack of any real default rule is the 
idea that the assumption of responsibility test is actually an autonomous limit on recovery. If 
that were the case, it would simply add to remoteness in certain scenarios. This is the view that 
the courts have adopted, for example, in Supershield, and that appears to be accepted by the 
editors of Chitty on Contracts. 95  However, this understanding would preserve all of the 
efficiency problems of remoteness, but would add the burden of a further, even vaguer test, 
without as much as a clear scope of application. Surely ‘exceptional circumstances’ is an 
unsatisfactory definition of such scope.96 The uncertainty would not only greatly increase 
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litigation costs, but would render the law of remedies unpredictable, inducing higher 
transaction costs. 
The assumption of responsibility theory is, in conclusion, untenable as either a legal or 
an economic proposition. The question, then, is how The Achilleas can be interpreted to comply 
with the normative prescriptions of economic analysis. Wee suggests that what should be taken 
from The Achilleas is the so-called ‘soft’ version of the assumption of responsibility test. This 
merely preserves remoteness under a different guise – that of the subject of a presumptive 
agreement on recoverable damages – but allows the implication (in fact) of terms further 
limiting liability, under the more stringent tests that common law has developed for such 
implication.97 In practice, this is no different from the rule of remoteness. It is suggested that 
the better option, in light of economic analysis, is to consider that the assumption of 
responsibility reasoning displaces remoteness or other such liability-limiting defaults.98 The 
background default rule thus activated is none other than the expectation measure of damages 
as per Robinson v Harman. This can be displaced not only by express terms limiting liability, 
but also by terms implied according to existing law, ie by custom99 or under the stringent 
officious bystander 100  or business efficacy 101  test. Such rigorous tests will minimise the 
possibility that a liability limiting clause is imputed outside the sphere of cases where the 
parties genuinely must have intended such limitation as an ex ante efficient solution. This 
proposition is compatible with the facts of The Achilleas. There, no reference was made by 
Lords Hoffmann and Hope to any liability-limiting default rule replacing remoteness, with the 
emphasis being placed on the parties’ agreement. According to Lord Hoffmann, all the cases 
and textbooks suggested damages are limited to the difference between the market rate and the 
charter rate for the period of delay. Furthermore, all market participants understood the same 
and there was no suggestion anywhere of even the theoretical possibility of recovering the full 
loss of profit from a follow-on fixture.102 Against this backdrop, the limitation of liability could 
arguably be implied by custom or at least under the officious bystander or the business efficacy 
test, due consideration being given to Lord Hoffmann’s own principles of contextual objective 
interpretation.103 The assumption of responsibility test does not, therefore, need to be anything 
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more exotic than the existing law on the implication of terms, applied to the limitation of 
liability. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that, rather than merely complicating the landscape of 
liability-limiting devices, The Achilleas could be interpreted in line with the normative 
prescriptions of economic analysis. It could support an economically efficient regime that 
combines two elements: the rule of expectation damages and possible terms limiting liability, 
implied by custom or in fact under the stringent tests developed in the common law. 
2. US Law 
Despite interstate variations in contract law, the functional equivalent of remoteness in the US 
– unforeseeability as a limit on damages – displays certain common features that enable a 
critical economic assessment. These can be derived from unifying, although not formally 
binding, instruments such as the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts (Restatement) 
and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).104 
The Restatement provides in § 351 that recoverable damages are limited to the loss that 
the promisor had reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was 
made. This includes loss that follows from breach in the ordinary course of events or as a result 
of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the promisor had reason 
to know. The third paragraph of § 351 allows the courts to place further limitations on 
recoverable damages if justice so requires, for example by granting only reliance damages or, 
more generally, by reducing damages below the foreseeability threshold. Under § 2-713 and § 
2-715 UCC, a buyer can recover both incidental and consequential damages. The latter 
category includes ‘any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably 
be prevented by cover or otherwise’ and ‘injury to the person or property proximately resulting 
from any breach of warranty.’ The rules of the Restatement and the UCC are substantially 
similar. Incidental damages in the terminology of the UCC correspond to those that the official 
comments to the Restatement deem ‘general’ damages, which are the natural result of 
breach. 105  The unforeseeability limitation on damages in US law is thus very similar to 
traditional Hadley remoteness, with some subtle differences that have both negative and 
positive consequences as concerns efficiency. 
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As the traditional remoteness rule of English law, unforeseeability in the US is judged 
at the time of contracting and employs an objective test of what the promisor had reason to 
foresee based on the facts available to him.106 The parole evidence rule does not bar use of 
evidence extrinsic to the contract to prove what facts were brought by the promisee to the 
attention of the promisor. 107  No actual foresight is required. 108  US courts do not require 
foreseeability of either the precise nature of the damage or its extent. 109 Incidentally, the 
generalised reasoning is that suggested by Richard Posner, ie the idea that a promisee would 
be placed at a disadvantage if, to be able to recover damages, he were forced to disclose the 
profit expected from the contract.110  
A few key differences from English law can be identified. An essential feature of US 
law is the present-day generalised rejection of the tacit agreement test, which corresponds to 
the assumption of responsibility theory of The Achilleas. Justice Holmes had adopted the tacit 
agreement test at the beginning of the 20th century, in the Globe Refining judgment. It required 
that circumstances be such that the promisor may be presumed to have assented to the extent 
of liability imposed by the court.111 Although reiterated in some states,112 this view is now 
generally dismissed on grounds reminiscent of the jurisprudential criticism directed at The 
Achilleas. 113  The tacit assumption test is squarely rejected in the comments to both the 
Restatement 114  and the UCC. 115  Unlike the English system, US law has therefore not 
experienced a revival of the contractual solution that prevailed in the early Anglo-American 
law on the limitation of damages under the influence of the autonomy of will theory advocated 
by French lawyers of the 18th and early 19th centuries.116 Some reserves have to be made with 
regard to the implications of the Restatement’s authorisation for further limitations on damages, 
discussed below.  
A second notable difference from English law resides in the generalisation of the 
attempt to overcome the shortcomings of remoteness with respect to what exactly must be 
foreseeable. The widespread solution of US courts is to treat unforeseeable harm due to 
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extraordinary circumstances as effectively loss of a different kind.117 This is, to all intents and 
purposes, the Victoria Laundry approach to dealing with the problem of excessive liability.118 
Its questionable applicability in English law after cases such as Parsons, Brown and Jackson 
arguably led to the solution applied in The Achilleas.119  
A third difference is – at least apparently – the use of a more stringent test of 
foreseeability in US law. § 351 of the Restatement requires that the loss be foreseeable as a 
‘probable’ result of breach. It is tempting to believe that, in substance, this test requires a greater 
degree of foreseeability than the reasonable contemplation approach taken by English courts. 
However, such difference may be overstated. The comments to the Restatement suggest that 
this terminology was meant merely to indicate a more stringent test of foreseeability than the 
one prevailing in tort law under the notion of ‘proximate causation’.120 If that is the case, then 
‘probable’ may express no higher degree of foreseeability than the various expressions used by 
the House of Lords in The Heron II. Such formulations were also meant to contrast the test of 
remoteness in contract with the reasonable foreseeability requirement in tort.121 
Finally, a more substantial difference is the authorisation given by the Restatement for 
further limitations on damages, as justice requires. Interestingly, the formulation of this 
authorisation is reminiscent of the assumption of responsibility theory in so far as it concerns, 
for example, cases of extreme disproportion between the price received and the liability that 
the promisor stands to incur.122 
From the standpoint of economic analysis, the picture of unforeseeability in US law is 
very similar to that of traditional remoteness in English law. The fact that the required 
foreseeability concerns, at least as a rule, the type of loss rather than its extent undermines the 
purported economic functions of remoteness. The promisor is left with little indication as to 
his expected liability. This outcome goes against the idea that this limit on damages is genuinely 
workable as an information-disclosure mechanism that supports efficient rates of contracting 
and precaution. Some aid is given by the greater inclination of courts to resort to solutions 
similar to that adopted in Victoria Laundry. Such solutions tend to place a cap, however 
unclear, on the extent of damages, thus bringing unforeseeability closer to the idealised image 
of remoteness that economic models tend to present. Whereas in English law The Achilleas 
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might mark an opportunity for efficient adaptations of the law through a more widespread use 
of the expectation measure combined with the implication of terms limiting liability, no such 
prospect is apparent in US law. Notably, the only currently accepted trace of the assumption of 
responsibility approach seems to consist of certain applications of the Restatement’s 
authorisation for further limitations on damages. These, however, merely add to the default 
rule of unforeseeability, making the net result similar to the inefficient and costly ‘soft’ version 
of the assumption of responsibility theory.123  
3. German Law 
It is sometimes considered that German law contains no rule of foreseeability akin to the one 
present in the French Civil code and borrowed by the common law. 124  This statement is 
inaccurate when viewed through the lens of the functionality approach of comparative 
methodology.125 There are three elements of German contract law which converge to fulfil a 
function similar to that of remoteness.  
The first such element is the doctrine of adequate causation (‘Ädaquanztheorie’).126 
Developed by legal scholars as a limitation on damages both in tort and in contract, this doctrine 
is not, on a proper construction, a theory of cause, but rather one of limitation of liability on 
equitable grounds.127 Alternatively, it is treated as a mechanism for the apportionment or 
imputation of loss depending on its extent.128 The doctrine functions as an exclusionary rule 
which bars from recovery consequences exceeding all human experience,129 with the foresight 
imputed to the promisor being that of an ‘optimal’ or ‘ideal’ observer (‘optimale 
Beobachter’).130 The adequate causation test is applied at the time of the wrong, which, in 
contract, is the time of breach.131 This point of reference, combined with the very high standard 
used for imputing knowledge to the promisor, means that the doctrine very rarely functions as 
an effective limitation on damages.132 
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A second device used to limit liability in ways that are functionally similar to how 
remoteness has developed in the common law is the doctrine of the aim or purpose of the rule 
(‘Schutzzweck der Norm’).133 It makes the extent of liability dependent on the purpose of 
contractual undertakings,134 an approach resonant of both SAAMCO and The Achilleas. How 
this more generous limitation on damages correlates with the doctrine of adequate causation is 
controversial. The prevailing opinion is that, in theory, both limitations apply,135 although the 
purposive approach to liability is of greater practical importance.136 
Finally, a third liability-limiting device akin to remoteness can be found in § 254 (2) I 
of the BGB, which provides one of the three modalities of contributory negligence. Under this 
provision, contributory negligence is deemed to include failure by the promisee to inform the 
promisor of the danger of abnormally extensive damage, if the promisor was not and ought not 
to have been aware of such damage. The underlying rationale is one of causation.137 The 
damage is considered as caused, at least in part, by the promisee’s failure to draw attention to 
extensive loss which may have warranted special precaution by the promisor. Judicial inquiry 
into the knowledge that should be imputed to the promisor makes allowance for the particular 
circumstances of the promisor, suggesting a more subjective test compared to remoteness.138 
For example, in a famous case, a jeweller’s employee left valuable jewellery in the boot of his 
car, that he requested the hotel’s staff to park without drawing attention to the valuables. These 
were subsequently stolen. The Bundesgerichtshof remanded the case for consideration of 
whether and how the loss should be apportioned, account being taken, inter alia, of the hotel’s 
standing and the justified expectation of high quality service held by customers.139 The same 
case suggests that the limitation can operate with respect to the extent of the loss and not 
necessarily with respect to a certain type of loss, since the issue of apportionment was raised 
despite the case involving only one type of loss. Because § 254 is also applicable to torts, there 
is no reason in principle to limit this particular instance of contributory negligence to the failure 
to communicate information at the moment when the contract is concluded. Instead, it should 
occur where there is a failure to communicate information at any time prior to breach. Despite 
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the wide theoretical field of application of § 254 BGB, it is worth noting that, as Professor 
Markesinis points out, this particular provision is rarely applied in German law.140 
The doctrines of adequate causation and the purpose of the norm, as well as § 254 BGB 
demonstrate that, contrary to what a superficial analysis might suggest, German law does 
contain at least partial functional equivalents of remoteness. A number of conclusions of 
economic analysis are possible with regard to these. A preliminary observation should be that 
damages in German contract law are, as a rule, assessed in line with the expectation measure.141 
In addition, notwithstanding nominal preference for specific performance, German contract 
law is, functionally, less hostile to efficient breach than sometimes assumed by common 
lawyers.142 It might actually be better suited to align damages with the expectation interest 
particularly because of the self-selection – as opposed to court selection – of promisees who 
resort to the remedy of damages. Economic analysis of the equivalents of remoteness should 
therefore not shy from an assessment against, among others, the benchmark of efficient breach. 
The doctrine of adequate causation, with its very high standard of an ideal observer and its 
application at the time of breach, is in line with the theory of efficient breach stretched to its 
practical limits. It therefore appears not to interfere with the expectation measure’s aptitude for 
regulating rates of contracting and precaution. The doctrine of the purpose of the norm is 
similar to the assumption of responsibility theory.143 It can, from a practical perspective, offer 
the same opportunities as The Achilleas in terms of combining an expectation damages rule 
with exceptional instances of implied limitations of liability, as this German doctrine is not a 
sweeping default limitation such as remoteness. Rather, it is an exceptional device developed 
by jurisprudence precisely to contain unusual cases of excessive damages. Seen from the 
perspective of the law in action, § 254 BGB is rarely applied in practice and is not anchored in 
either the time of the contract as a reference point for foreseeability or the type (rather than 
extent) of loss as its object. As such, it is closer to the intermediate system proposed by 
Eisenberg than to pure Hadley remoteness and should therefore be more efficient than the latter. 
In conclusion, the overall exceptional nature – in relation to the rule of expectation 
damages – of foreseeability-related limitations of liability in German law, as well as their 
specific features, provide arguments to the effect that German contract law can, as concerns 
this particular problem, be more efficient than both the English and US functional equivalents. 
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This conclusion must, however, be accompanied by the reservation concerning the costs (and 
efficiency losses) which may result from the three devices’ theoretical aptitude for 
simultaneous application. 
4. French and Quebec Law 
It is perhaps appropriate to end the comparative analysis with the legal system that first 
deployed, as positive law, a foreseeability-based limitation on liability. Distilled by Du Moulin 
and subsequently Pothier,144 this limitation was absorbed into the 1804 French Civil code 
(FCC) and successfully infused into Anglo-American law on the basis of Pothier’s works,145 
and into civil law systems which used the FCC as a prototype for their own codifications of 
civil law.146 The province of Quebec in Canada provides one example of such influence. This 
illustration is made more interesting by the contemporary perspective offered by its 
recodification of private law in the 1991 Civil code (QCC), which proves the impressive 
durability of Pothier’s proposition.  
Article 1150 FCC provides that the promisor is only liable for damages that were 
foreseen or could have been foreseen at the time of the contract, so long as the breach was not 
fraudulent. The Quebec counterpart of the rule is codified in Article 1613 QCC. In the relevant 
part, it provides that the promisor ‘is only liable for damages that were foreseen or foreseeable 
at the time when the obligation was contracted, where the failure to perform does not proceed 
from intentional or gross fault on his part’. 
On its face, apart from its application being circumscribed to negligent breach, the 
foreseeability limitation on damages seems strikingly similar to traditional Hadley remoteness 
and unforeseeability in US law. As these common law functional equivalents, the foreseeability 
limitation employs the abstract (or objective) standard of foresight of the reasonable promisor, 
and uses the moment of contracting rather than breach as its reference point, in both France147 
and Quebec.148 The rule allows use of extrinsic proof of facts that, being known to the promisor 
at the time of contracting, made it possible to deduce the damage (eg the promisee’s 
declarations as to the use that performance would be put to, or the exterior appearance of the 
goods transported by a carrier).149 The source of unforeseeability can be both uncommunicated 
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peculiarities of the promisee’s expectations and entirely extrinsic events which augment the 
promisee’s interest in performance.150 
Despite such superficial similarities, the French and Quebec rules exhibit fundamental 
particularities from the viewpoint of economic analysis. First, as early as 1924, the French Cour 
de cassation, going against the opinions of early commentators of the FCC, held that the object 
of foreseeability is the extent and not merely the cause or type of the damage. 151 In that 
instance, the court denied recovery beyond the declared value of the lost goods to a shipper 
who had understated such value to the carrier in an attempt to subsequently pay lower customs 
duties.152 A second important particularity is the seemingly wider allowance made in practice 
for the subjective characteristics of the promisor, specifically those enabling the imputation of 
better foresight than that warranted by a strict application of the objective test.153 Yet another 
difference from the common law equivalents is the limited practical applicability of the 
foreseeability limitation. Foreseeability is, in both France and Quebec, plainly a default rule of 
positive law, but its scope of application is, in practice, very limited. The express exception to 
the limitation contained in Article 1150 FCC, concerning cases of fraudulent breach, has been 
extended by French case law to instances of gross negligence. Article 1613 QCC codifies this 
assimilation. Since a 1969 judgment of the Cour de cassation, fraud or intent itself is interpreted 
widely as merely the intention to breach, for whatever reason (for example, to make a more 
profitable contract with a third party), rather than a direct intent to harm the promisee.154 The 
solution is equally applicable in Quebec.155 Other judge-made restrictions are also noteworthy. 
In France, as a result of the wider allowance made for individual above-average foresight 
abilities, there is a tendency for professional negligence to be treated as an instance of gross 
negligence. This results in a practical exclusion of the benefit of Article 1150 for promisors 
acting in a professional capacity. 156  In Quebec, there is widespread agreement on the 
inapplicability of the foreseeability limitation in cases of harm concerning physical integrity,157 
an exception which appears similar to the (isolated) approach taken by Lord Denning in 
Parsons. 
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Superficial similarity to Anglo-American equivalents thus masks differences with 
important implications in terms of economic efficiency. Certainly, as in the case of German 
law, complex debates can be framed on the extent to which French law is compatible with the 
theory of efficient breach.158 Nevertheless, considered in itself, the foreseeability limitation of 
French and Quebec law is arguably more conducive to efficiency than its common law 
counterparts, although less so than the rather marginal limitations that exist in German law. 
Indeed, because it emphasises foreseeability of the extent of damage, and not its type, the rule 
of French and Quebec law is actually closer than its common law equivalents to the idealised 
version of remoteness that economic models portray. It can, therefore, stimulate efficiency in 
the rates of contracting and precaution. Its inapplicability in a considerable range of cases, 
especially in instances of intentional breach, is conducive to efficient breach, which raises 
precisely the issue of a calculated choice between performance and breach. 
In conclusion, perhaps curiously given, that it was the remoteness/unforeseeability rule 
of common law that spawned a wide range of economic analyses, the French and Quebec law 
on this subject is arguably superior from an efficiency standpoint. These systems afford a wider 




This paper sought to argue that economic models of remoteness are perhaps overly optimistic 
as concerns the economic efficiency of this doctrine and of its functional equivalents. A closer 
inspection reveals a contrast between what the doctrine is supposed to achieve in terms of 
efficient rates of contracting, precaution against breach and reliance, on one side, and how the 
rule actually operates compared to other possible regimes, on the other. Against this 
background, the traditional doctrine of Hadley remoteness is less efficient than it might appear 
from economic models. Even the idealised version of remoteness of such models is less 
efficient than regimes such as that suggested by Eisenberg and especially that of the full 
expectation damages rule. Applying the economic analysis framework to the relevant rules of 
English, US, German, French, and Quebec law, an argument can be made to the effect that, 
from the perspective of the particular problem subject to analysis, the English and the US 
systems fare worst in terms of efficiency. With respect to the former, however, the judgment 
in The Achilleas has injected an element of flexibility that, from a normative perspective, opens 
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the door to more efficient interpretations of the law. German law, with its very restricted 
application of foreseeability-based limitations of damages and, correspondingly, its broader 
protection of the expectation interest, is arguably the most efficient, while the French and 
Quebec systems occupy the middle ground. 
Some overarching points of a more general nature arise from this analysis. First, the 
law and economics movement often takes for granted the idea that economic efficiency is 
somehow built into the common law. Second, economic analysis would benefit from the 
broader view of comparative law as much as legislators and courts would benefit, in turn, from 
the positive interpretations and the normative recommendations that economic analysis can 
provide.
